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Introduction
Urban planners, geographers and environmental psychologists have long been interested in the human's perception of the environment (e.g. [10, 30] ) and AI researchers have in the past attempted to develop computational models of the underlying processes (e.g. [9, 25, 42] ). Yeap [42] strongly argued that it is important to know what should be computed in a cognitive map based initially on information derived from one's sensory perception of the environment. Such a map is termed a raw cognitive map . He further argued that the first step is to compute a representation of each local environment visited. These local environments are then connected, in the way which they have been experienced, to form the raw map. However, defining what constitutes a local environment and especially its boundary is a problem. This is particularly the case when one has to explore the environment in a piecemeal fashion and with very noisy input. When does one local environment end and another begin? How does one recognise previously computed local environments when they are traversed on different routes?
We refer to the representation computed for each local environment as an Absolute Space Representation (ASR). Our earlier implementations of an ASR focused on the use of surfaces which are large enough to prevent one from moving out of the current local environment (e.g. see [44] ). These surfaces act as natural barriers and by selecting the appropriate ones, the current local environment is identified. Technically, the general problem is to find suitable connections between surfaces to form a boundary surrounding the viewer. Fig. 1 shows an example of an automaton with a 360-degree view of its environment producing a roomlike ASR. However, in general, the perceived surfaces could be connected in any arbitrary manner to form a boundary enclosing the viewer. Are there any useful criteria (say, similar to those for computing the shape of objects [32] ) for judging the suitability of the shape computed? We believe not. This is because it is not the shape of the ASR per se that is important but rather it is the perception of the empty space which lies ahead of the viewer. This space invariably changes, depending on the vantage point and the clarity of view, and it is not something for which one has to compute a fixed canonical shape as is the case for object recognition.
We are interested in designing a cognitive algorithm for computing local environments. We begin by making two observations, both of which support the argument that the immediate task is to compute the local environment for the activities that will take place within it rather than for building a raw map. This is in contrast to many earlier studies of the cognitive mapping process including those of our own and as we shall soon see, has helped us to bridge the gap between cognitive mapping and vision. The two observations are:
(i) Humans cannot compute a cognitive map from a single experience of the environment.
This might be explained conveniently by pointing out that humans simply cannot remember all the information perceived. However, we argue that such forgetfulness implies that what is computed must already be useful to the individual in more important ways than simply as being a building block for computing the raw map. If this was not so then to compute and to simply forget would be an unnecessary waste of one's effort.
(ii) Anthropologists tell us that humans were wanderers and hunters before they became settlers. Once the wanderer had moved on to new places there was no need to return to familiar places and hence no need to construct a raw map. Thus the need for such a map came much later in the evolutionary process. However, they would have needed a representation for each local environment at the time they were visited so that they knew where their kin were located and where their prey (enemy) was and how they could get to (away from) it.
The first observation prompts us to ask why exactly do we want to compute a description of each local space and the second suggests an important reason for doing so. For that purpose, we argue that the important pieces of information which need to be made explicit are the extent of the local environment and its exits. Such information must be easily computed from the input since humans seem to move from one place to another effortlessly, giving us the impression that the required information is available almost immediately. Vision research tells us that human vision has many ways of computing depth, from which we expect the extent of a local environment, once defined, could be computed. We will show, using simulated 2D environments, how exits are identified from the input and once they are identified, how the computation of the boundary of local environments naturally follows. It is important to point out that our implementation, although tested using simulated 2D environments, does not use any information not easily available in the real world. Although this is the case, our primary concern here is to understand why these computations evolved as they did rather than with the design of a suitable implementation in the real world. Following the successful computation of ASRs in our simulation, two other problems were investigated, namely the problem of recognising ASRs re-visited and the problem of remembering ASRs as part of a raw cognitive map. In the former, we show how Yeap's [42] memory for one's immediate surroundings (MFIS) can be constructed as a global map of ASRs always centered on the current ASR. In the latter, we show how a raw map of "fuzzy" ASRs is constructed and used to study how a human could learn a cognitive map. A synopsis of the paper now follows.
The theory underpinning our approach can be found in Yeap's [42] computational theory of cognitive mapping and which we briefly review in section 2.0. In section 3.0, we discuss ASR computations and show the various results from our simulation studies. Section 3.1 presents our new algorithm for computing an ASR, emphasising the importance of making explicit exit information in addition to surfaces in view. A straightforward definition for an exit is used which is based on the observation that a gap is present when one (reasonably large) surface occludes another. Thus, an exit is the shortest edge covering the occluded edge. By covering, it is meant that the viewer must cross the exit in order to reach the occluded edge. In the implementation, we show how such exits are computed and how they are used to compute ASRs. Briefly, to compute exits we need to identify where occlusions occur, i.e. we need to (i) identify large surfaces in view (those which can obstruct one's motion), and (ii) which of the surfaces in view are in front of their neighbouring surfaces. Having identified exits, we discuss, in section 3.2, the problems of computing the initial shape of the ASR and how it will be extended later as the local environment is being explored. Both problems turn out to be solved easily. The former requires that one eliminate surfaces which can be seen through an exit since they are outside the ASR. The latter is solved by realising that there are two kinds of exits, a doubtless exit (with no occluded vertices) and a doubtful exit (with one occluded vertex), and that one needs to extend only from a doubtful exit.
Section 3.3 discusses the problem of recognising ASRs re-visited and section 3.4 briefly touches on the problem of computing ASRs in an "open" environment. For the recognition problem, we continue to develop Yeap's [42] idea of using a memory for one's immediate surroundings (MFIS) as a crude means of recognising ASRs which one has just visited. This structure contains the ASR currently occupied by the viewer and the most recently visited ASRs which are closeby. The spatial layout of these ASRs is remembered collectively in a global coordinate system. Knowing the location of these ASRs in a global sense one can easily determine when one of them is revisited.
Humans do not remember much of their early experiences with a novel environment. Thus, what should be stored in the raw map, at least initially, are "fuzzy" ASRs. Section 3.5 shows how fuzzy ASRs could be created and the behaviour which could be obtained using a raw map of fuzzy ASRs. With hindsight, we note that if what is created in the raw map is a network of fuzzy ASRs, then the map initially would be very confusing unless some recognition of ASRs, as they are re-visited, is possible. This is especially true of those just visited in one's immediate surroundings. With no recognition, every time one moved from one ASR to another and back again, three fuzzy ASRs would result in one's cognitive map instead of two, i.e. there would be two ASRs computed for the initial local space. Using the MFIS to recognise recently visited ASRs it is possible to avoid the storage of duplicate ASRs for the same physical spaces at least within the immediate surroundings. The MFIS can thus be seen as a structure which enables a more orderly perception of our immediate surroundings. Fig. 2 shows one of the simulated environments being used to test our algorithm. In this example, the robot executed 1697 commands to move through the environment while maintaining an MFIS. The robot computed 124 different ASRs. Fig. 3 shows the ASRs computed.
In the concluding section, section 4.0, the theory is re-visited to discuss its significance with respect to other work . In particular, section 4.1 discusses how landmark theories of cognitive mapping could be combined with our approach. We conclude with a technical definition of what it means to form a landmark, namely the marking or enhancement of information in the raw map by the object recognition process. In section 4.2 we discus Chown et al.'s [6] model of cognitive mapping which appeared in the literature recently. Their model is similar to ours in that what is proposed is also based on the idea of computing local environments visited. Section 4.3 provides a summary of our work and raises some of the immediate questions that we have not answered in the body of the paper.
Yeap's Computational Theory of Cognitive Maps
In Marr's ( [31] , p.3) words, vision is the "process of discovering from images what is present in the world, and where it is". However, vision cannot tell you what is behind you or Fig. 2 The environment used to test our algorithms. The environment is obtained from [34] and reprinted with permission. The "eye", currently looking at the shaded region, represents a simulated robot/person.
what to expect when you turn the corner. Computing a larger picture of what is out there is the task of cognitive mapping. For vision, the problem is to recover the information from what is basically a 2D image but for cognitive mapping, the problem is not simply recording what is out there and extending it as more is perceived. This is because humans can rarely remember everything perceived from the start to the end of a journey. The cognitive map must be developed over time.
The question is what is remembered first and how is that information to be useful later? Finding an answer to this question is compounded by the fact that the process receives input from all the different senses, is influenced by what one knows, and is interrupted by all the other activities that took place during the journey. Cognitive mapping is thus a complex process which involves both one's perception and conception of the outside world. Like vision, it should be studied as an information-processing task and as Marr ([31] , p.27) has argued, the first and most critical step is to identify a computa- Fig. 3 The ASRs computed as the path in Fig. 2 was traversed. Note that the ASRs are laid out in a global coordinate system for display purposes. In reality each ASR has its own local coordinate system and is connected to adjacent ASRs only via traversed exits. The shape of each ASR stored in the raw map would be simplified since its exact shape is not recorded.
tional theory which explains what is to be computed and why it should be computed. Yeap proposed one such theory and an overview is presented below.
When designing a computational theory, the first step is to clearly identify the input to the process. Yeap observed that although a cognitive map is the result of integrating information from all the different senses, there is usually a primary sense whose information provides the basis for building a cognitive map. From this, one could compute in the raw map a description of how the surfaces in view are arranged using a nonegocentric reference frame. However, not any nonegocentric spatial description of the surfaces in view would be useful. For example, one which captures all the surfaces in view would not be useful since this contains too much information for our purpose. What is needed is a spatial description which tells us the (rough) shape and extent of the current local environment encompassing the individual. Such a representation emphasises the local environment's spatiality (or its empty space) rather than its content.
Yeap suggested that the boundary for each local environment should be computed only from surfaces which are perceived as obstacles to the viewer's movements, thus ignoring the smaller objects in view. The gaps between these obstacles naturally become the exits. A description of each local environment thus computed represents a unique local space in one's memory. The space exists on its own. It is absolute. It has its own co-ordinate system. Other things could be described in it and events that happened there could be remembered.
Yeap referred to such a description as an Absolute Space Representation (ASR). The raw map then is a network of ASRs. A link between two ASRs in the network is created as the result of the direct experience of moving between the two ASRs. When the viewer leaves the current ASR, a new ASR is to be computed immediately. In this way, the viewer feels bounded in the local environment. That this is important is demonstrated in some experiments on how rats and children perceive their environments [3, 5, 12, 21, 22] .
Such a raw map has several advantages too. Its parts are computed locally and their relations describe the way in which an individual experiences the world rather than the way in which the world is structured. That a human's cognitive map is very much dependent on how the environment is experienced is clearly demonstrated in an interesting experiment by Wood and Beck [41] . In it, they showed how the tourists' remembered two physically adjacent structures as being far apart because these structures are experienced as the last building in two different journeys starting from the same place but moving in opposite directions. Such a map is not sensitive to every change in the environment and hence it is stable, reflecting the (relatively) unchanging world in which we live. It can be developed incrementally since it is neither necessary to have a complete description of each ASR nor the relations between individual ASRs in the map before one can use the information sensibly. This complies with the principle of graceful degradation. Since the environment is partitioned in a modular fashion, it allows the individuals to compute the different parts of the environment independently.
Except for its network structure, the raw map contains much information that has not yet been organised. The full cognitive map is proposed as a collection of representations which grows out of the raw map, each of which imposes a particular way of looking at (some of) the information in the raw map. One important notion is the concept of a "place" and in particular, the concept of "activity-places" [38] . Many experiments (e.g., [4, 19] ) have demonstrated the hierarchical nature of a place representation. Using the ASRs, one could form a hierarchy of places by grouping one or more ASRs as a place, one or more places as a higher-order place, and so on. However, our concern in this paper is with how the raw map is computed and not with the full map. We will therefore not discuss the full map further.
The key to a successful implementation of the raw map lies in knowing how an ASR is computed from successive views of the whole environment. A suitable algorithm is presented next.
ASR Computations -A Cognitive Approach
We have developed a new algorithm for computing an ASR which is centred on the idea that identification of exits is the cornerstone to computing a description of the local space. We show how exits are defined and how the initial shape, obtained from a single 150-degree view, is extended as more of the local environment is perceived. We tested our algorithm using two simulated 2D environments and various results are presented. We further investigated how the ASRs computed could be used in the cognitive mapping process to form a raw map. Two problems were studied, namely recognising ASRs re-visited in one's immediate surroundings and remembering ASRs as fuzzy ASRs in a raw map.
Computing the boundary of the ASR
Exits are identified as follows. Whenever one surface is viewed as occluded by another surface, a gap exists which we label as an occluded edge (for example, see edges BC, FG, and IJ in Fig. 4 ). The occluded edge and the exit, are thus virtual surfaces. For simplicity, the surfaces of individual objects, i.e. surfaces below the viewer's line of sight inside the local environment, are ignored. An exit is the shortest edge covering the occluded edge. By covering, it is meant that the viewer must cross the exit in order to reach the occluded edge. For example in Fig. 4 , the exit JF is said to cover the occluded edge FG (and IJ). Computing this is straightforward. Firstly the surfaces in the current view are divided about the occluded edge FG so that F is in group I (FD, DC, BA) and G in group II (KJ, IG). Then the exit is found by taking the occluding vertex F and connecting it to the nearest point (to F) on a surface in the group opposite to it, i.e. group II. Candidate points are H and J, but J is the closest point to F so the exit is JF. Coincidentally, both points J and F are occluding. However, only the point at which the exit is calculated, point F in this case, must be an occluding vertex. If point F had been closer to H than J, H would have been preferred and it is not an occluding vertex. The points to consider when calculating the exit at point B are C, E, G, and J and the exit becomes BC.
Once the exits are computed, the boundary is obtained by removing exits and surfaces which are perceived as outside the current ASR, a process dubbed "trimming" (see Fig. 5 ). In Fig. 5 (a) it is obvious that surfaces s3, s4 and s5 are outside the ASR boundary and should be removed but it is less clear which surfaces should be removed in Fig. 5 (b) . One solution would be that the ASR boundary comprise surfaces s1, s2, s6, s7 and exit e3 with surfaces s4, s5, s3 and exit e2 being removed. If this ASR boundary were chosen then surfaces s4 and s5 would be contained within the boundary rather than being part of it. An alternative solution would be for the ASR boundary to comprise surfaces s1, s2, s4, s5, s6, s7 and exit e2 with surface s3 and exit e3 being removed. It was noted that part of exit e3 appears in an unexplored portion of the environment and this part could well be a solid wall rather than an open space. An important consideration in deciding which is the more suitable boundary is what the ASR actually means to the viewer. As has been argued earlier, its overriding purpose is to indicate the extent of the open space which surrounds the viewer. Surfaces s4 and s5 indicate the limit of open space in one direction and should thus be part of the boundary. Exits which are not completely in view such as e3 in Fig. 5 (b) should not be considered as part of the boundary. The algorithm ensures this by not allowing "phantom" exits (i.e. those with one vertex not directly perceived to touch a surface) to be created and this greatly simplifies the trimming algorithm. Since the list of surfaces for forming the ASR boundary is ordered as they appear, from the left periphery to the right periphery in each view, the trimming process merely involves removing surfaces and exits which come between the two surfaces directly beside the exit. The former must be perceived as behind the latter and thus should be removed.
The basic steps of the computation are as follows: Given a list of surfaces in the current view ordered from the left to the right, exits are computed. Each exit (a virtual boundary descriptor) is then inserted into the list of surfaces in view so that the surface to the left of it is always the surface connected to the exit's left vertex. Trimming begins by scanning surfaces to the right of the exit. Surfaces on the right of the exit are removed until one is found which is connected to the exit's right vertex. In the example in Fig. 5 (a) the surfaces depicted together with exits would be listed as (s1 s2 e2 s3 e3 s4 s5 s6 s7). When trimming, e2 is first encountered and the algorithm will look for s6 as its right adjacent surface. In its search, it will remove s3 through to s5. The result is the ASR boundary. The algorithm for computing the boundary is given below:
The list of surfaces in the current view. Surfaces are ordered as they appear in the current view from the leftmost periphery to the rightmost periphery. Label this list POTENTIAL-ASR. The exit used to enter the ASR, label this E1. 3. Return POTENTIAL-ASR as the ASR boundary.
The steps from the algorithm above are followed for the local environment as shown in Fig.  6 (a) to obtain:
Steps Input POTENTIAL-ASR: (s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9); E1
1.1 EXIT-vertex1: s1-vertex2
1.2 SET1: (s1) & SET2: (s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9)
1.3 EXIT-vertex2: s3-vertex1
1.4 POTENTIAL-ASR: (s1 (exit-e2 s1-vertex2 s3-vertex1) s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9)
1.5 POTENTIAL-ASR: (s1 (exit-e2 s1-vertex2 s3-vertex1 doubtless) s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9)
1.6 POTENTIAL-ASR: (s1 (exit-e2 s2 s6 doubtless) s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9)
1.1 EXIT-vertex1: s4-vertex2
1.2 SET1: (s1 s3 s4) & SET2: (s5 s6 s7 s8 s9)
1.3 EXIT-vertex2: s8-vertex1
1.4 POTENTIAL-ASR: (s1 (exit-e2 s1-vertex2 s3-vertex1 doubtless) s3 s4 (exit-e3 s4-vertex2 s8-vertex1) s5 s6 s7 s8 s9)
s3 s4 (exit-e3 s4-vertex2 s8-vertex1 doubtless) s5 s6 s7 s8 s9)
1.6 POTENTIAL-ASR s1 (exit-e2 s1-vertex2 s3-vertex1 doubtless) s3 s4 (exit-e3 s4-vertex2 s8-vertex1 doubtless) s8 s9) removing s5, s6, and s7 in the last steps also removed all the occluding vertices and thus the algorithm moves to step 2 2. POTENTIAL-ASR: (E1 (side-exit-e4 e1-vertex2 s1-vertex1 doubtful) s1
(exit-e2 s1-vertex2 s3-vertex1 doubtless) s3 s4 (exit-e3 s4-vertex2 s8-vertex1 doubtless) s8 s9 (side-exit-e5 s9-vertex2 e1-vertex1 doubtful)) 3. ASR computed: (E1 (side-exit-e4 e1-vertex2 s1-vertex1 doubtful) s1 (exite2 s1-vertex2 s3-vertex1 doubtless) s3 s4 (exit-e3 s4-vertex2 s8-vertex1 doubtless) s8 s9 (side-exit-e5 s9-vertex2 e1-vertex1 doubtful)). The ASR as output is shown in Fig. 6 
(b)
Crossing an exit is the signal for a new ASR to be computed. Once traversed it is out of sight but the viewer will still remember it as a way of exiting the current space and it provides an important link with the ASR just left. More importantly, until the ASR is computed and some other exits identified (if there are any), it is the only way the viewer knows how to leave the current space. Thus this exit is always included in the ASR and is labelled e1. The side exits (if needed) are inserted between exit e1 and the peripheries of the current view. Figures 7 and 8 show the ASRs computed for some of the local spaces in the environment depicted in Fig. 2 . In Fig. 7 (a) the only occlusion occurs at a periphery and therefore all that is required is to insert the side exits e2 and e3. In Fig. 7 (b) exit e2 covers the occluded edge between s1 and s2, e3 the occluded edge between s2 and s3, and e4 the occluded edge between s10 and s9. Exit e6 covers the occluded edge between s14 and a surface not depicted. Exits e8 and e9 are side exits. Fig. 8 (a) shows an ASR computed along a corridor. Note that if the robot, in the real world, could not clearly perceive the far end of the corridor, the overall shape computed would still remain the same as shown. Fig. 8 (b) and Fig. 8 (c) show the ASRs computed for spaces which have a more complicated arrangement of surfaces than those depicted so far. In Fig. 8 (b) exit e5 appears alongside the surface s6. The occlusion of s7 by s6 is minimal and is not immediately obvious. However, it becomes so if one considers that only one side of a surface can be in view at any one time and surfaces are labelled on the side which is in view. Exit e5 completely "covers" the side of s6 which cannot be seen and the role of the exit here is merely to represent a part of the environment the viewer is unsure of. Thus exits have a dual role -to indicate parts of the current space which have not been "uncovered" and, in the traditional sense, to indicate where one can leave the current space. These two roles are easily distinguished and will be discussed further in the next section in the context of updating the ASR. Side exits are inserted into the ASR in Fig. 8 (b) to account for the peripheries, by connecting e1 to s1 on the left, forming exit e2 and to s9 on its right, giving exit e6.
Note that it is the overall shape of the local environment produced that is important. For display purposes throughout this paper, we show the corresponding surfaces and exactly where each exit lies.
Updating ASRs
As the viewer moves around the current local space, the shape of the ASR keeps changing as areas that were once occluded come into view. Since exits mark areas of occlusion, this means that exits should be updated when the occlusions they cover are no longer or are less occluded. However not all exits should be updated. It is important to distinguish exits which take one out of the current space and those which cover parts of the current space not yet discovered. If it were possible to update the former then one could end up with a single ASR representing the whole environment! The solution here is to describe the former as doubtless and the latter as doubtful exits. A doubtless exit will always be the shortest possible length and it will have no occluded vertices, i.e. both vertices must be clearly visible; crossing such an exit is the signal that the current local space has been exited. By contrast, one of a doubtful exit's vertices will be occluded and it is this exit which is filled in when more information becomes available. In Fig. 9 (a) e1 is the exit crossed to enter the ASR and is thus a doubtless exit as is e3 since both of its vertices are (or as in the case of e1 have been) fully in view. Exit e2 is doubtful because one of its vertices arises from the occlusion of s2 by s3. Exit e4 is a side exit formed by connecting the unconnected vertex of e1 to the surface s1 at the periphery. Side exits also cover a part of the ASR which is uncertain so they too are labelled as doubtful.
To update a doubtful exit a simple algorithm is used: replace the previously computed description with the latest. An ASR is computed for the latest view. Side exits are computed as before to fill in the peripheries. Now if the surfaces/exits incident on each vertex of a doubtful exit (from the previous description) can be identified in the latest ASR description then the doubtful exit can be replaced with the latest description. This is possible if one assumes that one rarely makes a turn so large that one could not detect the overlap between the previous and the current view. The doubtful exit will be replaced by the surfaces and exits which lie between its incident surfaces in the latest ASR description. Fig. 9 shows the updating process as the trajectory displayed is followed. The trajectory in Fig. 9 (a) starts at the point where the viewer arrives in the ASR and it is first computed. In Fig. 9 (b) , as the viewer turns along the trajectory, surfaces s12 -s16 come into view. The ASR description for this view contains the exit e1 and surface s1 which are the surface and exit incident on the doubtful exit, e4 in Fig. 9 (a) . Thus, e4 is replaced by the surfaces and exits which lie between e1 and s1 in the latest ASR description and the ASR which results is shown in Fig.  9 (b). Note that a new side-exit, e7, is supplied with the new description. Finally in Fig. 9 (c) the surface s20 comes into view and this surface replaces the doubtful exit e7.
Thus the doubtless exits prevent the ASR boundary from expanding indefinitely. Of course, as more of the region surrounding the occlusion becomes visible, a doubtful exit may be replaced by another doubtful exit and it in turn by another doubtful exit and so on. But eventually a doubtful exit will be replaced by a doubtless exit preventing any further development of the boundary at this occlusion. Fig. 10 demonstrates an occluded region expanding until a doubtless exit emerges to give it its final shape. When the exit finally becomes doubtless it is computed just like any other exit, i.e. the algorithm requires that the exit be the shortest exit which will cover the occlusion. Hence in Fig. 10 (d) edl4 intersects s4 rather than connecting at its end-point. When this happens, the vertex (of edl4) is fully in view and the exit has become doubtless. There is still an occlusion but it does not involve the exit. The occlusion is now outside the ASR. The algorithm for updating an ASR as described above is outlined in detail below. Because updating doubtful exits actually extends the ASR we call this algorithm EXTEND-ASR. (a) 3. Return CURRENT-ASR as the updated ASR.
Recognising ASRs -A Memory for the Immediate Surroundings
We have argued that the cognitive mapping process begins with computing a representation of one's local environment which may or may not be remembered as part of one's raw cognitive map. For those that are remembered, they will exist as part of a muddled, intertwined, sometimes confused and sometimes very accurate memory of one's experiences. How could these various fragments of one's experience be later turned into a useful and clear representation of one's environment? One obvious answer is to use other sources of information to assist the individual to remember the different ASRs computed and how they are related. When one experiences the environment, one does not only perceive surfaces but also remembers what has happened and what and where the interesting objects are.
However, one problem with the use of such information is that at present it is unclear how the information itself becomes available to the individual. Furthermore, individuals develop such knowledge and preferences based on many years of interaction in the environment. Without understanding how these processes work, it would be difficult to know how such knowledge is brought to bear on what is computed in the raw map. In this section, we continue our bottom-up approach to cognitive mapping and ask: Is there any direct use for the ASRs computed before information from other sources becomes essential to the cognitive mapping process?
Yeap [42] proposed one such application, namely to create a global memory of the viewer's immediate surroundings, and we investigate the idea further. Based upon the observations of our own visual system, such as a limited view and limited range vision, and our visual behaviour, such as the need for active scanning [33] , psychologists have suggested that we need to integrate the different views to form a more complete picture of what we perceive of our surroundings (e.g. [2, 13] ). However, the issue of how such a representation is computed does not seem to have been dealt with. There are two major problems. The first concerns the definition of the immediate surroundings itself. When one moves a step, has one's immediate surroundings changed? If it has, the representation could be computationally very expensive to maintain. The second concerns the amount of information that needs to be tracked. How could one then maintain a reasonably accurate representation given that one's perception of the world is inherently very noisy? We discuss these issues below and show how a representation of one's immediate surroundings based upon the notion of ASRs is much easier to compute and maintain. Such a representation is referred to as an MFIS (a Memory For one's Immediate Surroundings) and we show two results using the MFIS as part of a cognitive mapping process in our simulation studies. The first shows the viewer using the MFIS to recognise a local space revisited and the second demonstrates that it is not always possible to do so.
Technically, the first problem concerns what frame of reference is appropriate for the MFIS. One could use either an egocentric (i.e. defining spatial positions in relation to the self) or an allocentric (i.e. defining spatial positions external to the self) frame of reference. It is clear that from an implementation viewpoint, it is inefficient to use an egocentric reference frame. To use an allocentric reference frame, one has to specify where the reference frame should be centered. The choice of this external point need not be chosen arbitrarily if we use the current ASR as the frame of reference. An ASR has a boundary and any part of it would be suitable. In the implementation we choose to use the entrance to the current ASR as the center of the reference frame. When one moves out of the current ASR, the MFIS is shifted to center on the entrance to the next ASR. Fig. 11 shows how the MFIS defined as such would follow the viewer moving through the environment.
The extent of the MFIS can be defined arbitrarily but, more importantly, need not be defined exactly, say, in metric terms. Varying its size is a tradeoff between how much information is remembered (and hence how useful the MFIS is) and how much effort is required to compute it. Given an MFIS with a fixed size, part of an ASR will often be excluded as it lies outside the area covered by the MFIS (see Fig. 11 ). One advantage of having the MFIS is to help one recognise that nearby local spaces were visited before. We therefore do not want to remove a part of an ASR (from the MFIS) because it just falls outside the area covered by the MFIS. Since its extent is defined arbitrarily, it is better to include the whole ASR if a part of it lies within the area covered by the MFIS. Fig. 12 shows how the MFIS defined as such would grow and shrink as the viewer moves through the environment.
The second problem, which concerns the vast amount of information that needs to be tracked, can now be solved by observing that the spatial arrangement of individual surfaces in each ASR is already maintained in the ASRs themselves. Tracking them becomes effortless as long as we treat the ASR as a whole when maintaining the MFIS.
With an MFIS the viewer knows whereabouts recently visited ASRs are in relation to the current ASR. When an exit in the current ASR is crossed it can be determined from the MFS if this exit has taken the viewer into one of its ASRs. The appropriate neighbouring ASR is retrieved instead of computing a new one. All the updating to the MFIS occurs at the time an ASR is entered. Algorithm ENTRY which takes care of all the housekeeping needed when the current ASR changes is as follows:
The surfaces in the current view, call this CURRENT-VIEW The ASRs in the MFIS, call this MFIS The exit just crossed, call this CROSSED-EXIT The ASR just departed, call this PREV-ASR The raw cognitive map, call it RCM 
Compute a new ASR from the CURRENT-VIEW and call it NEW-ASR

CROSSED-EXIT is not an exit in CURRENT-ASR.
Select an exit in CURRENT-ASR and centre CURRENT-ASR's coordinate system on it.
If ASR-VISITED=true then
use NEW-ASR to extend CURRENT-ASR
If CURRENT-ASR not in MFIS then
add CURRENT-ASR to MFIS 6. Update the MFIS so that it uses the same coordinate system as CURRENT-ASR.
7. Since the centre of the MFIS has shifted remove from its content any ASRs which are now outside its extent.
Thus ASR recognition is achieved in two ways: (i) when two ASRs are experienced in sequence it can be remembered that a particular shared exit joins the two ASRs and traversing this exit will take the viewer from one of these ASRs into the other, and (ii) it can be detected that one is re-entering a recently visited ASR stored in the MFIS. The success of (i) depends on a direct connection being made in the network of ASRs (the raw cognitive map) between two ASRS which share an exit. However, we demonstrate in section 3.5 that this is not always possible. The strength of (ii) lies in its ability to identify two previously computed ASRs as neighbours even though they were not initially experienced as such.
Note that different shaped ASRs are often computed for the same physical space when the space is initially viewed from a different vantage point. The result is that sometimes an ASR is computed which partially overlaps a recently visited ASR in the MFIS. At some point the viewer could be simultaneously in two (or more) ASRs. Fortunately, there is no need to detect that the viewer is in one of these other ASRs until the current ASR is exited. The only concern at this level in the cognitive mapping process is to provide a suitable representation for viewer's current local space. One representation is all that is necessary and one need look no futher than CURRENT-ASR for a suitable representation. Once the viewer leaves the current local space, i.e. crosses an exit in CURRENT-ASR, it then becomes prudent to avoid computing a new ASR for the space the viewer is entering if one can detect that one has already been computed. If the boundary of this previously computed ASR adjoins the ASR just departed, i.e. the exit crossed is on the boundary of both ASRs, then the coordinate system of the newly entered ASR and the MFIS is centred on a vertex of this exit. However, if the ASR just entered partially overlaps the ASR just departed then the crossed exit may only exist on the boundary of the departed ASR and thus cannot be used as the centre of the newly entered ASR's coordinate system. The coordinate system of the ASR and the MFIS is instead centred on the exit which is closest (in distance) to the point where the viewer entered the ASR.
We show two examples of using an MFIS in our simulations. Fig. 13 (a) shows that the MFIS currently holds 4 ASRs. Note that in the actual implementation, all ASRs remembered are "simplified" so that what is recorded is its approximate size and shape rather than the exact number of surfaces. The exact display of each ASR is used here to assist the reader in identifying the physical space it represents. As the viewer moves to the current position as shown in Fig. 13 (b) , the MFIS continues to grow (ASRs 5, 6, and 7 are added) and shrink (ASR 1 removed). Fig. 13 (c) shows that the viewer recognises ASR 4 when it moves into it from ASR 7. Fig. 14 shows an example in which the viewer fails to recognise an ASR revisited. In this case, ASR 4 is not recognised and a new ASR 18 is created.
Thus once ASRs are computed, they provide us with a convenient basis to develop the MFIS. With the MFIS, one can perform a limited form of recognition of ASRs when they are revisited. This could be a useful device for helping autonomous robots to learn about their environments.
An Open Environment
Defining the open space surrounding the viewer is straighforward in the closed environment found indoors and in cluttered outdoors environments. But how does our algorithm fare in open environments where the transition from one ASR to the next is less clear? Fig. 15 shows an outdoors environment. From a theoretical point of view one should be able to compute an ASR anywhere. We just need to define the extent of the open space surrounding the viewer, thus the boundary of the ASR could comprise "as far as the eye can see" in one direction or a group of trees or people in another direction. Fig. 16 shows the ASRs computed for a path which traverses the environment in Fig. 15 . It demonstrates that our algorithm computes a reasonable representation for an open environment using simulated input. However, to be more realistic, one has to address many other issues which are not apparent in the simulation and these include:
1. the significance of naturally occurring features such as trees, rivers and mountains;
2. perspective and the blurring of things perceived further away so that when travelling through a large open space, some far away exits are not perceived. To what extent will this affect ASR computations?
3. the variability of views in such ASRs. Compare for example the scene at a popular seaside resort on a public holiday in mid-summer with the same scene in mid-winter or a forest before and after clear fellling. 
Beyond the ASR -Remembering ASRs "Qualitatively" in a Raw Cognitive Map
Computing the local space in this way is a necessary first step but once one moves out of the current space, it is evidently clear that, at least for humans, one does not remember the exact details of its shape. Determining the ongoing nature of spatial memories when they are no longer receiving immediate feedback from the environment is not easy. Psychological studies which examine this problem are mostly concerned with the manner in which the representations are distorted and their significance altered once they are merged into the wider "picture in the head". Variables such as size, distance and location are often systematically distorted by containment relations and the significance of an object as compared with others it is related to [19, 20, 37, 40] . However, these modifications result from some top-down processing, i.e. the input to the process is not only what has been computed bottom-up from the senses but also includes the results of earlier computations, often higher-level representations which are conceptually more sophisticated.
We are interested in the more immediate problem. Given a fairly precise description of the current local space, should we remember the precise description as part of the raw map and allow information in the raw map to degrade over time as, say, a part of our process of forgetting? Or, should we remember an imprecise description and improve it later if and when we have more experience of (and hence a need to remember well) the environment? We opt for the latter. Degrading over time (forgetting) implies that one could, at least in the beginning, remember all the precise detail computed while one occupied the local space. This seems an unlikey scenario for a human; rather it seems more reasonable that the human's cognitive map of a place improves with experience. It also follows the principle of least effort since it is easier to remember a less detailed description.
We compute such a representation by devolving the initial representation computed into a rectangle which roughly approximates its extent. A straightforward algorithm is usedpoints on the surfaces forming the boundary of the ASR are sampled to firstly find a good length for the rectangle and then the length itself is sampled to find a good width. We call this representation a fuzzy ASR. Fig. 17 (a) shows an initial ASR computed, its surfaces are labelled s1 -s5 and its exits e1 -e4. The fuzzy ASR computed from this ASR is shown in Fig. 17 (b) . We are in the early stages of studying this problem and therefore no claims are made as to the cognitive plausibility of our method. In reality many processes would be operating to modify the original ASR and we cannot claim to fully understand these. This is but one method for producing a fuzzy ASR. There will be many, many more.
The real significance of the fuzzy ASR for our computational theory is the manner in which the representation is able to be used to structure the cognitive map, however poorly. The fuzzy ASR does not comprise actual surfaces or exits, it merely represents a portion of space once occupied by the viewer. But one would expect the viewer to remember some of the connections to neighboring spaces, confused though they may be. Thus we can evaluate the program's performance in its ability to trace a learned path by allowing it to retain the connections to neighbouring fuzzy ASRs in different ways. We show the results of three tests below. For more see [23] .
In the first test, the viewer remembers how many exits there are in an ASR but no locational information is retained for them. For the fuzzy ASR in Fig. 17 (b) , for example, the viewer remembers just that there are four exits, e1, e2, e3 and e4. When the ASR is exited a connection is made to the ASR just entered but the viewer does not remember which exit was used. Our viewer has a very poor memory indeed! The outcome of this is a scenario often faced by humans -"I know I've been here before so which doorway did I use to get to..." Thus the information made explicit in a fuzzy ASR comprises the rough extent of the ASR, the number of exits in the ASR and which neighboring ASRs have been experienced as connected to this one. The results of the test are displayed in Fig. 18 . Fig. 18 (a) shows the portion of the environment traversed and Fig. 18 (b) a raw cognitive map constructed from the "exact" ASRs computed for each local space visited; note the global coordinate system the raw map appears to be using is for display purposes only. The fuzzy cognitive map constructed for the path in Fig. 18 (a) would comprise:
fuzzy-ASR1 with four exits, connected to ASR 2 fuzzy-ASR2 with two exits, connected to ASR 3, ASR 1 fuzzy-ASR3 with five exits, connected to ASR 4, ASR 2 fuzzy-ASR4 with three exits, connected to ASR 5, ASR 3 fuzzy-ASR5 with four exits, connected to ASR 6, ASR 4 fuzzy-ASR6 with three exits, connected to ASR 5 To demonstrate the use of a map with fuzzy ASRs, the viewer is then told to repeat the journey from start to finish in its head. Fig. 18 (c) demonstrates how confused the viewer could become. As the viewer imagines re-entering ASR 1, it knows from its fuzzy map that one of these exits leads into ASR 2 but not which one. The viewer randomly chooses an exit. The line emanating from the bottom of fuzzy ASR1, rather than its side, demonstrates that the viewer made an erroneous decision. It can be seen from the output from our computer simulations displayed in this figure that the errors made here result in rotation errors in the cognitive map and while they are not shown in this figure, translation errors are possible also. It may be worthwhile stressing that the program is imagining its path through the environment and therefore there is no reality check of the ASRs "visited".
In the second test we allowed the program to remember on which side of the fuzzy ASR the exits were located and thus on which side of a fuzzy ASR the connection to a particular ASR is located. Fig. 18 (d) shows the program's imagination of the path travesed. In ASR 1 the viewer recalls that ASR 1 connects to ASR 2 via an exit on the left side of ASR 1 and since there is only one such exit the correct choice is made. However, on the side of ASR 3 which connects to ASR 4 there are two exits. One leads directly into ASR 4 (see Fig. 18 (b) ) and one leads into an as yet unexplored region of the environment -this exit can be seen as the lighter shaded gap in the boundary directly adjacent to the exit into ASR 4 in Fig. 18 (b) . To visit ASR 4 from ASR 3 the viewer must choose between these exits and does so correctly (this time). If the incorrect exit had been chosen a translation error would have occurred.
The third test shows the viewer actually using its fuzzy cognitive map, to find its way back along a previously traversed path and failing to do so. However, only very primitive checks that the correct ASR is entered are used. The viewer firstly walked a path through its environment computing the fuzzy cognitive map. In Fig. 19 (a) we show the accurate map that would be computed for the same walk so that the reader can appreciate where the viewer is erring. The viewer remembered only that 10 ASRs had been visited and therefore attempted to go back through 10 ASRs. The viewer, on reaching ASR10, turns around and heads for home. With no contextual information available as a guide, and knowing only that one of ASR 10's exits leads into the next ASR along the path, i.e. ASR 9, the viewer randomly chooses an exit. It chooses correctly and enters ASR 9 in Fig. 19 (b) . When the viewer is in ASR 8 the wrong exit is chosen to enter ASR 7, but this is a dead-end and the viewer is forced to return to ASR 8 and then makes the correct choice. The viewer enters ASR 5 from a different side to that of its previous visit and a larger ASR is computed which incorporates both ASR 5 and ASR 4 of Fig. 19 (a) . Thus the viewer reaches ASR 3 of Fig. 19 (a) directly from ASR 5 and thinks that it is ASR 4. ASR 2 of Fig. 19 (a) is then entered as ASR 3. On exiting ASR 3 the viewer takes the wrong exit, choosing the one which will take it away from the "true" home ASR. Lastly, and confusingly, the viewer ends up back where it started, in the ASR at the end of the walk, but thinking instead that the "home" ASR has been reached.
We have shown how the underlying structure of the cognitive map emerges as the program explores its environment, computing muddy descriptions, uncertain as to how they are connected. Such a map is not an unrealistic representation of a person's initial exploration of the environment. However a viewer using one of these maps to navigate around its environment would soon become lost. How is such a map enriched as the viewer becomes more familiar with its environment, not in precise metric terms, but merely in terms of being able to work out roughly where places and objects are in relation to others? Is this the role of landmarks? The "fuzzy cognitive map" has given us a framework in which we can study these problems. The fuzzy ASR provides a structure in which the viewer's experience of the environment can be charted. Eventually important details will be recorded and significant events remembered; some will be remembered well, some poorly. The fuzzy ASR will continue to evolve to reflect the ever changing memories one has for the spatial environment.
Discussion
We observed that the cognitive mapping process begins by computing representations for one's local enviroments (or ASRs) without necessarily remembering them. When designing the algorithm which does this, it is thus important to find out why the representation is computed. In particular, what is the immediate task which the representation is designed to solve?
We have argued that the primary reason is to give the individual an immediate impression of the extent of its local environment and where its exits are. In the implementation, we showed that once exits are identified, they provide a straightforward basis for computing the extent of the local environment. We have also shown how the adjacent ASRs computed could be used to form a global map describing one's immediate surroundings. Such a map, which is referred to as an MFIS, is useful for recognising adjacent ASRs re-visited immediately. The ASRs which are finally entered into the raw map, however, are inexact and their interconnections may or may not be precise. Fig. 20 shows the early cognitive mapping process as described.
The next two sections discuss the significance of our theory of cognitive mapping with respect to existing work.
On landmark theories of cognitive mapping
A popular theory of cognitive mapping, strongly supported by environmental psychologists (see for example [1, 7, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18] ), is that the initial map computed is a loosely connected network of landmarks. This has led to several simulation studies of cognitive mapping investigating how such a map changes with experience. Thus, for example, the TOUR model ( [25] but see also [26] ) showed how symbolic descriptions of places are assimilated, NAVIGATOR [16] studied a variety of issues related to how a cognitive map is learned from travelling in a simulated city, TRAVELLER [27] showed how different cognitive maps are generated from simulating movement through a network of nodes, and several recent connectionist models (e.g. NAPS [28] ) of cognitive maps were given "landmarks" and showed how a network could be "learned".
However, the question of what happens to one's experiences in between landmarks has not been resolved in these studies. A network of landmarks implies that the landmarks are connected in some way and one would expect that these connections have something to do with what happens in between the landmarks. If not, how could a network of landmarks be formed without remembering how they are connected? That this question cannot be ignored is evident in some recent attempts to implement the landmark-based idea in autonomous mobile robots. For example, in Tsuji and his co-workers' [39, 45, 46] work on computing a qualitative description of the environment traversed, a network of landmarks is computed from a panoramic record of all the objects perceived (see Fig. 21 ). In QUALNAV [8, 29] , a robot is provided with a panoramic 360-degree view and from these views, viewframes are computed which encode landmark position. However, a new viewframe is computed whenever an existing landmark disappears or a new one appears or the ordering of existing ones changes. Both works show significant computations at each view throughout the journey prior to the construction of a network of landmarks. Given that landmarks should be few and far between, how could they be of use in the cognitive mapping process? It follows from our theory of cognitive mapping that the importance of landmark information lies in providing the initial access to the ASRs in the raw map. If the initial map consists of fuzzy ASRs as we have shown it, then accessing any of the ASRs in it would be very difficult (except perhaps those at the start and end of the journey). The role of the landmark is to make some of the ASRs more accessible. Note that environmental psychologists have observed the wide-ranging characteristics of landmarks in people [36, 37] . This implies that the perception of a landmark depends as much on one's conception of the world as it does on one's perception of it. Its computation should therefore be parallel to and quite independent of the process of computing the raw map.
That perceiving landmarks requires an individual to attend to the details of what is perceived makes the object recognition process a natural starting point for landmark perception. We conclude with an attempt to formalise the definition of "landmarking" i.e. the process of creating a landmark (or marking a piece of "land") in the raw map. If a piece of information passes from the object recognition process to the raw map, it becomes a landmark (see Fig. 22 ). Object recognition in this sense would include much more than 3D object recognition (specifically object identification). It implies some high level reasoning of 
what is perceived based on one's experience. Note that the "mark" created need not be about the ASR itself. In fact, it is more likely for enhancing one of the objects inside or outside an ASR. If outside, the object will be connected to several surrounding ASRs. Whether it is possible to have a network of landmarks depends on whether one could establish a directional link between them.
On related theories of cognitive mapping
Our approach emphasises describing each local environment as a space of its own, void of anything, but which could then act as a container for describing the things in it and to provide a locus of activity. Some recent models of cognitve maps include the idea of computing a description of each local space/environment visited. For example, in Chown et. al's [6] PLAN model of cognitive mapping, it is suggested that a network of local maps are computed in addition to a network of landmarks. In Poucet's [35] recent review of cognitive mapping in animals, he suggested that local views are integrated to form "places" which are representations of local environments independent of any specific local view. Both ideas are similar to our notion of an ASR. However, Poucet offered little detail on computational issues whereas an attempt to implement part of the PLAN model is found in RPLAN [24] . We therefore discuss further PLAN and RPLAN below.
In RPLAN, the robot takes snapshots of its environment at the gateways which mark the transitions between adjacent spaces. Gateways are entrances to rooms and intersections of hallways. From these snapshots, called scenes in RPLAN, visual cues (landmarks) are extracted and connected to the cells in a locational grid which cover its location in the scene (see Fig. 23 ). The full 360 degrees is divided into eight viewing directions and a locational grid constructed for each. Combined these form the directional grid which although it captures the full 360 degrees of the environment has an explicit forward direction which is the opposite direction to the previous gateway. Thus each direction in the directional grid is connected to a locational grid and each occupied cell in the locational grid is connected to a visual cue which occupies the same location in the scene. Combined the location and directional grids form the local map (see Fig. 24 ). It is interesting to note that in PLAN, it was suggested that each local map represents one's "directional space". That is, it tells us the direction of interesting neighbouring objects/landmarks. For example, and in Chown et al.'s [6] words, "when one is standing at the location corresponding to the local map, and when one desires to be facing a particular landmark, one should be able to use the local map to generate the relative change in orientation (p. 22 [6] )". Chown et al. further argued that a local map is not computed at the landmark but at points in the journey where people pause and look around. This idea is interesting and is closely related to our emphasis of the importance of exits in this paper and elsewhere [43] . However, in RPLAN, a local map is computed at each and every exit and is used to recognise where one is rather than as a directional space. If that is the case, their idea of a local map is more like our notion of an ASR. Furthermore, that landmarks are computed at each local space again contradicts their theory of cognitive mapping as outlined in PLAN. In PLAN, the network of local maps is computed initially to complement the network of landmarks. The former provides direction information which is lacking in the latter but it was also suggested that the former replaces the latter as one becomes more familiar with the environment (p. 29). This idea is different from ours and especially in the light of our discussion in section 4.1.
Summary
We now summarise our view of the cognitive mapping process and address some of the immediate questions that have not so far been answered: • The cognitive mapping process is one of the two processes which takes as input the 2 1/ 2D Sketch. The other is the object recognition process which includes higher-level reasoning of what is perceived. Both processes run in parallel.
• As each local environment is entered, our eyes scan its parts. Exits will be identified and the boundary of an ASR constructed. At the same time, the object recognition process analyses the objects in view and evaluates their significance. If the objects are significant, their presence in the raw map will be emphasised, effectively labelling them as landmarks. The ASRs containing them or their surrounding ASRs will be well remembered. We have not investigated this process and in particular the related problem of computing ASRs which contain objects.
• As a new ASR is computed, the MFIS is re-organised with its origin centered on the new ASR. This constantly provides a global picture of one's immediate surroundings and helps recognition of nearby ASRs if re-visited immediately. When one leaves an ASR, it is entered into the raw map but its shape will be inexact and its connection with other ASRs fuzzy.
• We need to investigate further the role of the MFIS in the construction of the ASRs. For example, if the ASR stays as part of the MFIS, is it necessary to remember it in the raw map? An advantage of using an MFIS is that when ASRs in the MFIS are revisited, one does not need to retrieve their description from the raw map for any updating. Perhaps one need only remember an ASR in the raw map when the ASR is to be removed from the MFIS. Since it is equally difficult to maintain an accurate global map of one's immediate surroundings, the information in the MFIS is already distorted. If ASRs are transferred from the MFIS to the raw map rather than when created, this may further explain why their shape and connection to other ASRs are fuzzy. It is also possible that for various reasons some ASRs simply disappear from the MFIS without being entered into the raw map. This could further explain the inability to have total recall of one's experience.
• We have shown how the use of fuzzy ASRs can reproduce some of the problems experienced by humans when learning a novel environment. We need to investigate how such a raw map could eventually be useful for finding one's way in one's environment. In particular we need to explore the consequences of recognising ASRs. For example, when multiple ASRs for the same physical space are established as such, should they be merged and if so, how?
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